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In many real world negotiations, from wage contract bargaining to product liabil-
ity disputes, the bargaining parties often interact repeatedly and have the option of
seeking outside judgement. This paper studies a model of repeated bargaining with
a third party to analyze how and why bargaining postures endogenously evolve over
time. A privately informed long-lived player bargains with a sequence of short-lived
players, one at a time. Should the players fail to reach an agreement, an unbiased yet
imperfect third party is called upon to make a judgement. The uninformed short-
lived players learn through two channels: observed behavior of the informed player
(\soft" information) and, if any, verdicts of the third party (\hard" information).
The long-lived player wants to guard his private information by bargaining tough
but at the expense of more information disclosure from the third party. As a result
of the strategic use of these two sources of information, the players' bargaining pos-
tures change as the uninformed players' beliefs evolve. Interestingly, as third party
information becomes more precise, the players adopt tough bargaining postures for a
wider range of beliefs. Many repeated bargaining problems can be analyzed in this
framework. In particular, the equilibrium dynamics provide an explanation for the
puzzling contrast between the bargaining postures of Merck and Pzer in their recent
high-prole product liability litigations. The results also help us understand several
other phenomena documented in the related literature.
21 Introduction
1.1 Overview
Recently, Merck and Pzer, two of the largest pharmaceutical manufacturers, have been
involved in a series of high-prole litigations surrounding their painkillers.1 Despite the close
similarity of their cases, the two rms have adopted contrasting approaches to the disputes.
Merck contested every case in court. After losing the rst case with a compensation verdict
of $253 million in 2005, it continued to ght and won most of the cases that reached juries
over the following two years. Subsequently, in 2007, the rm agreed to settle further 27,000
cases out of court for $4.85 billion in total, an amount far smaller than analysts and lawyers
predicted at the time of the drug's withdrawal and, especially, after Merck's rst defeat in
court.2 In sharp contrast, Pzer sought to settle its disputes before taking any of them to
court.3 How do we reconcile these dierences in bargaining postures?
Product liability litigations such as the above drugs cases in fact represent one of many
important applications of bargaining and dispute resolutions that share several distinguish-
ing characteristics. First, many negotiations feature repeated interactions between a large
player and a pool of small players. For example, a landlord often contests with tenants
over the amount of deposit to be returned and a rm routinely faces wage disputes with
its employees. Second, and more importantly, these disputes are rarely resolved by the two
sides alone. Amid the deadlock of a wage dispute, the bargaining parties often turn to a
third party, such as an arbitrator or even a court. When traders disagree on the quality of
goods or the terms of a deal, they hire an expert to make an assessment on their behalf.
Even when transactions are conducted smoothly without outside intervention, the third
party is usually in the shadow of the interaction.
In this paper, we develop a model of repeated bargaining with a third party, or an
\expert". A long-lived player (e.g. rm) is in dispute with a sequence of short-lived players
(e.g. customers, employees). The long-lived player has private information regarding his
responsibility towards a transfer (e.g. damage compensation, wage increase) to each short-
lived player. He is either \good" or \bad", with the bad type being more likely to be
1The drugs in dispute are Vioxx for Merck and Bextra and Celebrex for Pzer. They all belong to the
same class of painkillers known as COX-2 inhibitors.
2Source: New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/09/business/09merck.html
3Source: Wall Street Journal (May 2, 2008).
3responsible. For instance, a rm privately knows whether or not its prots are high enough
to warrant extra wages and a drug company has better knowledge about its own product's
link to the user's health problem. In each period, a new short-lived player enters the game
with a claim and makes a demand. If his demand is accepted, the short-lived player receives
the corresponding amount from the long-lived player and leaves the game. But, if the long-
lived player rejects the demand, an expert is called upon to make a decision on their behalf,
at a cost to each party. An expert verdict is publicly observable, and so are the details of
an agreement.
A critical aspect of this model is that expert verdicts are informative, unbiased but
nonetheless imperfect. The \quality" of an expert is measured by the parameter q 2 (1
2;1):
With probability q; he correctly rules a responsible (or non-responsible) long-lived player to
be indeed responsible (or not responsible). The expert is informative since q > 1
2, imperfect
since q < 1 and unbiased since, independently of the true state, he makes a mistake with
probability 1   q and the quality q is xed over time. For example, it could be that an
expert is drawn independently in each period from a pool of experts.
Learning of the uninformed short-lived players arises from two sources: the informed
long-run player's equilibrium actions and the decisions made by the expert, if any. We
interpret the former as \soft" information and the latter as \hard" information. The
interplay between these two sources of information is the key innovative feature of our
model that generates new, interesting equilibrium dynamics of bargaining postures and
enables us to analyze several empirical observations. We interpret the public belief about
the long-lived player being the good type as his \reputation". It turns out that the players'
bargaining postures, as well as the interplay between the two sources of information, are
characterized by two threshold levels of reputation, as illustrated by Figure 1 below:
Figure 1: Two thresholds
When reputation is above the upper threshold p, the short-lived player makes a low
demand and both types of the long-lived player accept it for sure. Here, the short-lived
4player takes a weak bargaining posture, while the long-lived player takes a tough bargaining
posture by never accepting any higher demand. This is where the full benets of successful
reputation building are reaped by the bad long-lived player. There is no learning on the
part of the short-lived players in this region either from soft or hard information, because
the long-lived player plays a pooling strategy and an agreement is reached without the
expert.
When reputation is intermediate, the short-lived players makes a large demand that the
good type cannot accept since this type expects a lower transfer from expert verdict. The
bad type mimics the good type and also rejects the demand for sure, with the prospect of
a high continuation payo (or a low expected transfer) in the neighboring high reputation
region. Rejection leads to an arrival of hard information which, in expectation, will reduce
the bad type's reputation. Here, learning occurs but only through hard information since
the long-lived player's pooling behavior conveys no soft information. The two parties
adopt incompatible tough bargaining postures and, hence, an agreement cannot be reached
without the third party.
When reputation is below the lower threshold p, the bad long-lived player faces a slim
prospect of a high continuation payo (or a low expected transfer) as the upper threshold is
far away, that is, many pieces of good luck (favorable expert verdicts) are needed to reach
the region where only low demands are made. Thus, he is willing to accommodate the tough
bargaining posture of the short-lived player. In equilibrium, the bad long-lived player builds
reputation by randomizing between tough and weak bargaining postures and, hence, hard
information arrives only occasionally. Here, the impact of hard information is reduced in
the presence of soft information and, in fact, soft information can sometimes revert the
adverse eects of hard information. We fully characterize an open interval within this low
reputation region where a brave rejection enhances reputation even after an unfavorable
expert verdict.
Our results provide an explanation of the contrasting bargaining postures adopted by
the two aforementioned pharmaceutical companies. Merck may have suered a damage
to its reputation by losing the rst case in court, but winning many other cases would
eventually take it to the high reputation region, where cases are settled for a low amount.
Nonetheless, the ex ante benet from building reputation from a low level is very small, and
it is costly to repeatedly resort to the court. This may well have been the reason behind
Pzer's decision.
5We also examine the eects of the expert quality q and the discount factor on the
players' bargaining postures. It is shown that, as q goes to 1; the low reputation region
is completely squeezed out by the intermediate region, while the high reputation region
shrinks (yet remain present). Since the players resort to the expert with probability 1 in the
intermediate region, our result may sound counterintuitive: why is a bad long-lived player
more willing to go to expert when the expert will nd him out almost surely? The reason
lies in the conict of interests between the forward-looking and myopic parties. When the
expert is very precise, the short-lived player's expected payo from expert verdict increases,
and this makes the demand too high for the long-lived player to tolerate. The long-lived
player is willing to take even a small chance of expert error; after all, a single mistake will
greatly enhance his reputation when hard information is very precise. We show that, as
the long-lived player becomes extremely patient, the low reputation region disappears and
the high reputation region remains unchanged.
We characterize the exact payo gain from reputation in all Markov equilibria. For low
prior beliefs, the ex ante benet is small, in contrast to the result of standard reputation
games (e.g. Fudenberg and Levine [8]). It is shown that all equilibria are characterized by
two threshold levels of reputation which determine the payo bounds. Furthermore, in any
equilibrium, there are two constant levels of demand that could be accepted. Interestingly,
this fact is consistent with observations documented in the legal literature.
1.2 Contributions
Theory of repeated bargaining This paper develops a repeated bargaining model that
explains how and why bargaining postures change over time. Related works on repeated
bargaining include Schmidt [17] and Hart and Tirole [10]. To focus on the repeated in-
teraction, we follow the literature and consider a simple bargaining protocol within each
transaction. What distinguishes our paper from other repeated bargaining models is the
presence of a third party. This feature is important for many applications. Real life transac-
tions seldom involve just a pair of bargainers; the \background" of the bargaining matters.
Experts, institutions and other third parties often inuence the outcome of a transaction
indirectly or directly. Note that the involvement of a third party is optional to the players in
6our model. The arrival of hard information is endogenous.4 As we demonstrate in this pa-
per, this realistic feature leads to distinct strategic implications and delievers new insights
about bargaining postures that cannot be captured by the standard repeated bargaining
models.
Theory of reputation Our results enrich the adverse selection theory of reputation
initiated by Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts and Wilson [13] and later developed by, among many
others, Fudenberg and Levine [8]. As Mailath and Samuelson [14] point out, in standard
reputation models, no players actually build reputation in equilibrium; the privately in-
formed player starts pooling with another type from the very beginning of the game and
so \reputation springs to life". Furthermore, even though reputation can increase the
equilibrium payo, reputation can always be built.
In many applications, these features are not completely realistic. By introducing the
interplay between soft and hard information, we show non-degenerate equilibrium dynamics
in which reputation can be built and maintained but not always. In our equilibrium, the bad
type attempts to gradually build up his reputation when it is low, but he can successfully do
so only with a probability strictly less than 1. Reputation may move up or down and also,
with a strictly positive probability, the bad type will reveal himself and hence fail to build
reputation. It is worth noting that the bad type reveals himself only when he voluntarily
gives up reputation building; hard information from the expert, due to its imperfectness,
can never lead to full revelation.
Another related work is by Bar-Isaac [3] who considers a repeated signaling model in
which the quality of a seller is imperfectly revealed in each period should he decide to pro-
duce.5 In his model, the buyers purchase the seller's product at a price equal to the seller's
expected quality and, thus, a buyer's response is a continuous and monotone function of the
seller's reputation level. In contrast, the short-lived players in our model are strategic as in
the other reputation models mentioned above. Indeed, we show that the short-lived players
essentially make one of just two demands in any Markov equilibrium, even though they are
allowed to choose any distribution over the real line. This prediction is actually important
since it claries some puzzling observations about the demand distribution documented in
4Deterministic arrival of hard information has been studied in education signaling models (e.g. Kremer
and Skryzpacz [12]).
5See also Bar-Isaac and Tadelis [4] for a comprenhensive survey of economic models on signaling and
reputation.
7the litigation literature (see Section 5). We also note that the equilibrium value function in
our model displays discontinuity, as similarly encountered by Mailath and Samuelson [14].
Our equilibrium construction, however, is entirely dierent from theirs.
Repeated settlement and litigation An important application of our analysis is
found in repeated litigations with long-lived defendants. The economic signicance of
such disputes are often strikingly large. For instance, in the year of 2007 alone, the US
experienced 177 federal securities fraud claims, where auditors and underwriters often face
lawsuits repeatedly, with a total disclosure loss of $151 billion.6 Also, in the US, the
claimed damages involved in medical malpractice litigations totaled $28.7 billion in 2004
and, around the same period, the corresponding amount was about e2.4 billion in Italy.7
Our repeated bargaining model enables us to piece together several empirical observa-
tions identied in the aforementioned product liability litigations, regarding the long-run
relationships between the strength of a case and settlement outcome (Alexander [2]) and
between the strength of a case and trial rate (Palmrose [16]). We shall discuss our contri-
bution to this literature in closer detail in Section 5.
1.3 Plan
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes a model of repeated
bargaining with a third party. In Section 3, we construct an equilibrium of the game and,
also, conduct comparative static analysis. Section 4 then presents general characterization




We consider a discrete time model. Periods are indexed by t = 1;2;:::. A single long-lived
player 1 faces an innite sequence of short-lived players 2, with a new player 2 entering in
every period. Each player 2 brings a claim to player 1:
6Source: Stanford law school securities class action clearinghouse, http://securities.stanford.edu.
7Source: OECD [15].
8Player 1 privately knows his type  2 fG;Bg, where G stands for good and B for bad.
Type B is responsible for each claim, while type G is not. The assumption is valid in
applications, such as the aforementioned Merck/Pzer cases, where the long-lived player
faces repeated disputes all related to some foregone act.8
The stake involved in each claim, denoted by H > 0, is xed and commonly known.
Alternatively, H could be the expectation of a xed distribution of uncertain stakes. Each
player 1-player 2 pair attempt to settle their dispute via voluntary bargaining. Should they
fail to reach an agreement, they call upon an external third party, an expert, an arbitrator
or a court, to determine whether player 1 is responsible or not. Both players are committed
to obey the third party's suggestion: player 1; if judged to be responsible, should pay H
to player 2; and player 2 should receive no transfer otherwise. Seeking a third party incurs
a cost ci > 0 to player i; regardless of the verdict. We shall henceforth refer to the third
party as an \expert".
The expert is informative, unbiased but imperfect: independently of the true type of






Specically, when player 1 is responsible (or not responsible), the expert will incorrectly rule
that the player is not responsible (or responsible) and hence owes nothing (or H) to player
2 with probability 1  q. We shall interpret q as the \quality" of the expert. Furthermore,
we shall assume that the quality of expert judgement is independent of history and, hence,
the expert is non-strategic.9
The timing of the stage game in period t is as follows. Player 2 makes a take-it-or-
leave-it demand st 2 R, which player 1 can either accept or reject. If st is accepted, then
player 1 transfers st to player 2; if the demand is rejected, an expert is called upon to make
a judgement. At the end of a period, player 2 leaves the game forever.
Note that if player 1 is of type B his expected transfer to player 2 under expert resolution
is equal to qH; if he is of type G the corresponding amount is (1   q)H. To focus on
interesting cases, it is assumed throughout that c1 + c2 < qH   (1   q)H = (2q   1)H.
An expert verdict is publicly observable, and so are the details of an agreement.10 The
8See Section 5 for further discussion on this assumption.
9See Section 5 for further discussion on this last assumption.
10As discussed in Section 5, our results are robust to the possibility of (endogenous) condentiality
agreements. We also note that our assumption is consistent with many cases of actual settlement bargaining
as, for example, in the securities/auditor cases studied by Alexander [2] and Palmrose [16]. The details
of any negotiation process (such as the value of rejected demands) are usually private information known
9rst player 2 holds a prior belief, p1 2 (0;1), that player 1 is good. Later short-lived players
update their beliefs from this prior and the public history that they observe. Let pt 2 [0;1]
denote player 2's posterior belief that player 1 is good in period t. This will be sometimes
referred to as player 1's \reputation."
2.2 Strategies, payos and equilibrium notion
A (behavioral) strategy of player 1 is a mapping from the set of all possible histories that
he can observe at the beginning of each period and the set of all possible demands from
player 2 to probability distributions over the set fA;Rg, where A and R denote acceptance
and rejection, respectively.
A (behavioral) strategy of player 2 in period t is a mapping from the set of all possible
histories that he can observe over preceding t   1 periods to probability distributions over
all possible demands, R.
We focus on perfect Bayesian equilibria in Markov strategies in which any relevant past
history can be summarized by the level of belief that it induces. A Markov strategy for
type  player 1, r, is
r
 : [0;1]  R ! [0;1]
such that r(p;s) is the probability with which type  rejects the demand s 2 R at belief
p 2 [0;1]:
The Markovian property renders irrelevant the period in which player 2 makes entry
and, hence, we shall write a Markov strategy for player 2, d, simply as
d : [0;1] ! 4(R)
such that d(p) 2 4(R) for any p 2 [0;1]:
If (rB;rG;d) is a Makrov strategy prole, we write type 's discounted average expected
payment at belief p as V (p) with discount factor  2 (0;1): This involves player 1's transfers
to player 2s as well as expert costs. Note that we have already surpressed the dependence
of V  on the strategy prole and the discount factor. Following the reputation literature,
our focus below will be on interesting equilibrium behavior of the bad type. Thus, when the
only to the negotiating parties. But, once a deal is struck, the terms of the deal often enter the public
domain.
10meaning is clear, we shall refer to V B(p) simply as V (p). Player 2 maximizes his expected
stage game payo while player 1 minimizes his (discounted average) expected payment.
A strategy prole (rB;rG;d); together with a system of beliefs, forms a Makrov perfect
Bayesian equilibrium if the usual conditions are satised. See, for instance, Fudenberg and
Tirole [9] for a formal denition. We will invoke a natural restriction of beliefs: when the
type is revealed, the game proceeds as if it has complete information. Note also that the
Markov property of the complete information game implies that the bad type, because his
type is known, will accept a demand equal to the best that he could expect from expert
verdict, that is, qH + c1.11
3 Equilibrium analysis
3.1 Equilibrium behavior of the good type
If a dispute goes to the expert, good player 1, in expectation, incurs total payment (1  
q)H + c1: It is then natural that this player 1 should not agree to pay anything above this
amount from bargaining with player 2. We shall assume throughout that, regardless of past
history, the good type accepts a demand if and only if it does not exceed (1   q)H + c1,
and any observation of deviation from this behavior reveals the bad type. Other similar
strategies with dierent cuto levels can also constitute an equilibrium but, as shall be
clear from our analysis and the equilibrium construction, they do not alter our ndings.
The cuto behavior of the good type appears similar to the irrational type's behavior
in the bargaining model of Abreu and Gul [1]. However, it is important to note that, in
our model, this behavior emerges as part of an equilibrium rather than as an assumption
often imposed in standard reputation models. Whenever we henceforth refer to player 1
without mentioning his type, we shall mean the bad type.
3.2 First intuition
Let us rst spell out some intuition. On the one hand, if player 2's posterior belief (on the
good type) is high, his expected payo from resolving the dispute via the expert is low and,
moreover, he has to pay a cost to obtain a verdict. Thus, when the belief is suciently
11We would have a folk theorem type result if the Markov property is not imposed.
11high, player 2 should make a low demand that will be accepted by both types of player 1
and the dispute is resolved without expert intervention.
If the posterior belief is low, on the other hand, player 2 expects to win a large transfer
if the case goes to the expert. The corresponding expectation of good player 1 is still low
and, therefore, player 2 should make a large demand that the good type will not tolerate.
How should the bad type respond?
If the bad type accepts this demand, he reveals his type and consequently his future
transfers will be high. He cannot therefore accept it with probability 1; otherwise, the
equilibrium belief following rejection must be 1, and the bad type would mimic the good
type by rejecting the demand. The bad type should also be reluctant to reject the large
demand for sure. An expert verdict is imperfect but nonetheless informative (q > 1
2). Thus,
it will hurt his reputation on average. Moreover, from a very low reputation level, the bad
type needs many pieces of good luck (favorable expert verdicts) in order to reach a level of
reputation high enough that player 2 begins to make low demands.
This suggests that, when his reputation is very low, the bad type should play a mixed
strategy: he rejects the high demand with an interior probability. The role of randomization
here is to mitigate the eect of a non-favorable expert verdict. Since the good type rejects
the demand for sure and the bad type rejects it only occasionally, the act of rejection will
itself enhance player 1's reputation and may even overturn the eect of a non-favorable
verdict.
Nonetheless, when reputation is suciently close to the point beyond which player 2
nds optimal to make a low demand, the bad type may still wish to fully mimic the good
type, reject the high demand with probability 1 and count on the chance that expert verdict
favors him. If he is lucky, his reputation will enter the region in which player 2 makes only
a small demand.
These arguments suggest that the equilibrium can be characterized by two threshold
beliefs that quantify the \low" and \high" reputation regions. This is indeed the case.
3.3 Formal description
We now formally describe the equilibrium characterized by two threshold beliefs, 0 < p <
p < 1, conrming our previous intuition.12 As is usual in a bargaining game, player 2 can
12In Section 4 below, we characterize the key properties of all Markov perfect Bayesian equilibria.
12make a demand which he knows will be rejected for sure; let us refer to such a demand as
a losing demand.
Figure 2 below illustrates the equilibrium strategies of the two players around three
belief \regions". The left panel describes player 2's demand as a function of the belief;
the right panel illustrates bad player 1's rejection probability of the equilibrium demand at
each belief level.
Figure 2: Equilibrium strategies
The low reputation region, (0;p). This is a region of learning through both soft and
hard information. Player 2 makes a high demand, equal to qH   c2, which the good
type will reject for sure.13 The bad type responds to such a demand by randomization; the
rejection probability is monotonically increasing in p over this region such that, at the lower
threshold p, it becomes exactly 1. The act of rejection itself leads to reputation building,
and the subsequent expert signal will also lead to learning from player 2. A favorable
verdict enhances reputation further, while a non-favorable verdict brings reputation back
down.
The intermediate reputation region, (p;p). This is a region of learning through hard
information alone. Here, player 2 makes a losing demand which both types reject with
probability 1. Player 2 does not learn from player 1's act of rejection per se; rather, the
learning takes place only through the realization of expert verdict.
13The amount of the high demand, qH c2, at low reputation levels turns out to be a general equilibrium
property. See Section 4.
13The high reputation region, (p;1). This is a region of no learning. The full benet of
reputation is obtained. Player 2 makes a low demand, equal to (1   q)H + c1, that both
types accept for sure.
The behavior at the two thresholds p and p are critical in the equilibrium construction.
In particular, at p, player 2 mixes between (1   q)H + c1 and a higher losing demand;
both types of player 1 accept (reject) the low (high) demand for sure. Of course, in order
to display reputational considerations, player 1 has to suciently care about the future.
Let   =
c1+c2
(2q 1)H+c1+c2. We next state the equilibrium formally.
Proposition 1 For any  >  , the following is the outcome of a Markov perfect Bayesian
equilibrium. There exist two thresholds, 0 < p < p < 1; such that:
 If p = 0, player 2 demands qH +c1 with probability 1; player 1 (the bad type) accepts
it with probability 1.








 If p 2 (p;p), player 2 makes a losing demand; player 1 rejects it with probability 1.
 If p = p, player 2 demands (1   q)H + c1 with probability x and makes a higher
losing demand with probability 1 x for some x 2 [0;1); player 1 accepts (1 q)H+c1
with probability 1 and rejects the other demand with probability 1.
 If p 2 (p;1], player 2 demands (1   q)H + c1 with probability 1; player 1 accepts it
with probability 1.
Figure 3 below illustrates bad player 1's equilibrium (discounted average) expected pay-
ment as a function of the belief. Indeed, the expected payment is decreasing in reputation;
however, it is a discontinuous step function with a nite number of jumps. The key ele-
ment of the equilibrium construction lies in devising continuation payments that provide
correct incentives. Before providing the details of construction, let us rst consider the
distinguishing features of reputation in our model.
14Figure 3: Equilibrium payments
The equilibrium displays some interesting features beyond the threshold dynamics.
First, if the game starts with a prior belief in the low reputation region, player 1's equilib-
rium payment converges to V (0) (the payment under complete information) as the discount
factor goes to 1. The gain from reputation building is small. Second, starting from any
interior prior, the posterior reaches the high reputation region (p;1) and then remains
there forever with an interior probability. Reputation can be built. Third, player 1 will
also fail to build reputation with a positive probability; this happens in the low reputation
region (0;p) where player 1 randomizes and reveals his type occasionally. Reputation can
be lost. Finally, in the low reputation region where both soft and hard information are
present, soft information can overturn hard information when their forces pull in opposite
directions. In particular, when p is low enough relative to p, even after a non-favorable
expert verdict the subsequent posterior at the beginning of the next period will be higher
than the current period's initial level. Our next Proposition summarizes these ndings
formally.
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium properties)
 \The gain from reputation building is small."
Suppose that p1 2 (0;p). Then, the reputation gain is V (0) V (p1) = (1 )(c1+c2);
where V (p1) = qH + c1   (1   )c2 and V (0) = qH + c1:
 \Reputation can be built."
15Suppose that p1 2 (0;p]. Then, the probability with which the equilibrium posterior
reaches the region (p;1) is positive.
 \Reputation can be lost."
Suppose that p1 2 (0;p]. Then, the probability with which the equilibrium posterior
falls to 0 is positive.
 \Soft information can overturn hard information."






. Suppose also that, in this period t, player 1




p(1   q) + (1   p)q
> pt:
We next discuss how the equilibrium responds to shifts in some key parameters. Of
particular interest is how the thresholds change in response to increased patience and
expert quality. We report limit results for technical reasons.
Proposition 3 (Comparative statics)
 As  goes to 1, p goes to 0; p is independent of .
 As q goes to 1, p goes to 0; p goes to
H c1 c2
H .
The impact of increased patience falls only on the lower threshold, p, which decreases.
Thus, it expands the region in which player 1 fully mimics the good type and rejects the
equilibrium demands for sure, thereby relying solely on expert verdicts. Although expert
resolution, on average, worsens reputation, a more patient long-lived player is willing to try
his luck earlier, in an eort to move into the no-learning region above the upper threshold,
p, where he incurs only a small amount of transfer.
As the expert quality increases, the intermediate reputation region also expands. But
here, this eect is achieved by a reduced lower threshold and an increased upper threshold,
p (whose corresponding limit is less than 1). This rst implies that the no-learning region
shrinks, and we may interpret this as suggesting that reputation is indeed more dicult to
build when the expert is more accurate.
16An increase in  from 0.75 to 0.9 indeed expands the intermediate region by inducing
more \steps"; the high reputation region and the corresponding payments remain the same
but the lower threshold falls and the payment at the low reputation region is pushed up.
Raising the expert precision from 0.7 to 0.97 shows a more drastic change. The inter-
mediate region is vastly expanded but it involves only one step. Both thresholds move, in
opposite directions. It is more dicult to build reputation and reach the high reputation
region; moreover, the payments during the reputation building process are also higher than
the benchmark. However, should player 1 succeed in reaching beyond the (increased) upper
threshold, the benets will actually be greater (lower payments).
The nal, bottom right-hand side, graph illustrates the eect of an increase in c2 (from
0.1 to 0.17), the expert cost incurred by player 2. Here, at any p, player 1's payment is
lower, or the same, compared to the benchmark. Thus, making the expert more costly to
player 2 may improve the benets of player 1's reputation building.
3.4 Details of construction
We now demonstrate the technique behind the equilibrium construction which we believe
to be innovative and interesting in its own right. The key is to install correct incentives
through continuation payments. It turns out that the right continuation payments take
the form illustrated in Figure 3 above, and nding such values requires a recursive process.
We will describe this process step by step.
Step 1 At p = 0, it is clearly mutually optimal for player 2 to demand qH + c1 and
player 1 to accept it. Once the posterior falls to 0, it remains at this level.
If p is suciently high, that is, at p > p (we later dene p), given the good type's
behavior, it is mutually optimal for player 2 to demand (1   q)H + c1 and (bad) player 1
to accept it.
If p is suciently low, that is, at p 2 (0;p] (we later dene p), the proposed equilibrium
strategies prescribe that player 2 demands qH   c2 and player 1 is indierent between
rejecting and accepting it. Player 1's expected payment is then given by what he obtains
from accepting and revealing his type. If player 1's type is revealed, the demand will be
qH + c1 in every period thereafter (and he is going to accept it) and, therefore, we have,
for every p 2 (0;p],
V (p) = (1   )(qH   c2) + (qH + c1) = qH + c1   (1   )c2: (1)
18In the next step, we shall construct continuation payments to support (1) as equilibrium
payments and make player 1 indierent. But rst, let us summarize the continuation
payment for p 2 [0;p] [ (p;1] in the following illustration.
Figure 5: Step 1
Step 2 We have to make player 1 indierent between accepting and rejecting the demand
qH c2 at p 2 (0;p]. Let the rejection probability be such that right after the rejection, but
before the expert verdict, the posterior belief is exactly p (therefore, at p, the rejection
probability is 1).
What is the continuation payment from rejecting? In the current period, player 1
expects to spend qH +c1 from going to the expert. As of the next period, the continuation
payment depends on the outcome of expert verdict. If he obtains an unfavorable verdict
(which happens with probability q), the posterior falls below p but then the continuation
payment is given by equation (1) in Step 1 above. If he obtains a favorable verdict, the
posterior improves to, say, p1 with continuation payment V (p1).14
The indierence condition of player 1 at p 2 (0;p] then requires the following Bellman
equation
V (p) = (1   )(qH + c1) + q [qH + c1   (1   )c2] + (1   q)V (p
1): (2)
Equations (1) and (2) pin down V (p1).15 Figure 6 below illustrates these arguments.




15It is easy to check that V (p1) > (1   q)H + c1 when  >  .
19Figure 6: Step 2
Step 3 We now turn to the continuation payment that supports V (p1) in equilibrium.
At p1, the proposed equilibrium requires player 1 to reject player 2's demand for sure.
The current period's expected payment is qH + c1. At the next period, if the expert
verdict is favorable, the posterior belief improves to, say, p2, with continuation payment
V (p2); otherwise, the belief goes back to p and the continuation payment V (p) is given by
equation (1) above. The Bellman equation that supports V (p1) as an equilibrium payment
is, therefore,
V (p
1) = (1   )(qH + c1) + qV (p
) + (1   q)V (p
2); (3)
and this delivers V (p2). Figure 7 below summarizes these arguments.
Figure 7: Step 3
20Step 4 By similar arguments, we can derive V (p3) that supports V (p2) in equilibrium
and so forth, and put together the following recursive equation to characterize V (pn) for
any integer n:16
V (p
n) = (1   )(qH + c1) + qV (p
n 1) + (1   q)V (p
n+1): (4)
Starting from the two initial conditions V (p) and V (p1), the solution to this second-
order dierence equation can easily be shown to be strictly decreasing and also divergent.
Therefore, eventually, V (pn) will drop below (1 q)H+c1, the lowest possible continuation
payment in equilibrium. This is illustrated in Figure 8 below.
Figure 8: Step 4
Let N be the smallest integer such that V (pN) > (1   q)H + c1. Note that V (pN) is
needed in order to support V (pN 1) as an equilibrium continuation payment, but we cannot
use V (pN+1) to support V (pN) if the former is less than (1   q)H + c1. Recall that the
recursive arguments here are based on player 1 rejecting player 2's demand for sure. This
16Note that the unbiased expert assumption, that the quality of expert judgement, q, is symmetric across
player 1 types, implies that the posterior updated from pn following a non-favorable verdict is exactly pn 1.
It is straightforward to verify that, for any integer n, if
pn =
pn 1q





pn(1   q) + (1   pn)q
:
21implies that, at pN, player 1 cannot reject player 2's demand with probability 1 (except in
the degenerate case where V (pN+1) = (1   q)H + c1 exactly).
The critical aspect of the equilibrium, therefore, is that, at pN, player 2 has to randomize
such that some demand is accepted while others are rejected. Indeed, player 2 will be
indierent exactly at pN = p.17 If his demand is rejected, player 2's expected payo from
going to the expert is p(1   q)H + (1   p)qH   c2: Therefore, from the indierence
condition p(1   q)H + (1   p)qH   c2 = (1   q)H + c1; we uniquely nd
p
 =
(2q   1)H   c1   c2
(2q   1)H
2 (0;1):
From pN = p, we backtrack to nd p; N consecutive unfavorable verdicts from
p gives p. The exact mixing probability that supports V (pN), or V (p), is computed in
Appendix. Since we now have p and p, we can also trace the entire continuation payment
schedule, which takes the form illustrated in Figure 3 above. These details also appear in
Appendix.
4 Some general properties of an equilibrium
The equilibrium constructed in the previous section exhibits a particular behavioral pattern.
We now turn to the question of whether any aspects of the equilibrium apply more generally
to an equilibrium. Our next results characterize some general properties of a Markov perfect
Bayesian equilibrium, while maintaining the following condition:
(C) The good type, regardless of past history, accepts a demand if and only if it does not
exceed (1   q)H + c1; acceptance of a demand strictly greater than (1   q)H + c1
reveals that player 1 is bad, both on and o the equilibrium path.
We start by examining the equilibrium strategies. The rst result states that bad player
1 must use a cuto strategy: there is a cuto level of demand associated with each posterior
belief such that any larger demand is rejected while any lower demand accepted.
Lemma 1 (Cuto strategy) Fix any  and any Markov perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Also, x any posterior p, and consider a demand s > (1   q)H + c1. The following is true
on or o the equilibrium path:
17We later show that the accepted demand here must be (1   q)H + c1.
22(1) If type B accepts s with a positive probability, then he must accept any s0 < s with
probability 1.
(2) If type B rejects s with a positive probability, then it must reject any s0 > s with
probability 1.
Next, we obtain a suprising property regarding player 2's demand in any equilibrium.
There are only two constant demand levels that could be accepted with postive probability
in equilibrium. Any other demands must be either o the equilibrium path or oered
and rejected in equilibrium. This general property has been conrmed in the particular
equilibrium constructed above.
Proposition 4 Fix any  >   and any Markov perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Suppose
that, in equilibrium before player 1 reveals his type, player 2 makes a demand which player
1 accepts with a positive probability. Then, the demand is either (1 q)H +c1 or qH  c2.
The demand (1   q)H + c1 follows from the assumption on the good type's behavior.
Let us argue that the only other acceptable equilibrium demand is qH  c2: Suppose to the
contrary that a higher demand is acceptable. Then, the acceptance must occur for sure.
This is because, otherwise, player 2 could protably deviate by demanding slightly less and
the deviation would be met with sure acceptance (since player 1 plays a cuto strategy).
Player 2 clearly has no incentive to demand anything less than qH   c2 (but greater than
(1 q)H+c1) since only the bad type would accept such a demand and the expected payo
under expert resolution conditional on player 1 being bad is qH   c2.
Our nal result examines player 1's expected equilibrium payments in any Markov
perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Let p =
(2q 1)H c1 c2
(2q 1)H be the upper threshold belief as
dened in the equilibrium construction in Section 3 above.
Proposition 5 Suppose that  >  . For any Markov perfect Bayesian equilibrium, there
exists p 2 (0;p) such that the following properties hold:
 V (0) = qH + c1.
 For any p 2 (0;p), V (p) = qH + c1   (1   )c2.
 For any p 2 (p;p], V (p) 2 [(1   q)H + c1;qH + c1   (1   )c2].
23 For any p 2 (p;1], V (p) = (1   q)H + c1.
Thus, we are able to obtain payment bounds for any equilibrium and, moreover, estab-
lish that the lower bound must be achieved when reputation is suciently high while the
upper bound is met when reputation is suciently low. The proof which utilizes a novel
argument with \downward induction on beliefs" can be found in Appendix.
5 Concluding discussion
In this section, we discuss the key assumptions of the model as well as some related work.
5.1 Robustness to the (un)observability of demands
We have assumed that accepted demands are publicly observable while rejected demands
are not. Our equilibrium in Section 3 is robust to the (un)observability of the details of
bargaining.
It is straightforward to see that the equilibrium continues to be valid when rejected
demands are also publicly observable. Even though we have assumed that short-lived
players do not observe previously rejected demands, it is common knowledge in equilibrium
that the rejected demands must always be qH   c2. Thus, it does not depend on whether
this amount is observable or not.
We can also incorporate unobservability of accepted demands into our model. As is often
the case in litigations, consider the two bargaining sides themselves choosing whether the
amount of transfer will be publicly observable or condential, should there be an agreement.
Even with this modication to the model our equilibrium is robust under the following
natural specication of belief upon observing a condential agreement: player 2 assigns
probability 1 to the bad type. This equilibrium survives the renements such as the intuitive
criterion. After all, it is natural that the good type who is innocent has nothing to hide.
This eliminates any benet of condentiality.18
18See Daughety and Reinganum [6][7] for two-period litigation models with endogenous condentiality
agreements.
245.2 Relation between type and responsibility
Recall that we have conducted the analysis under the assumption that type B (G) is always
responsible (not responsible) for each claim. Our analysis remains the same by instead
assuming the following structure. For each claim, type G is responsible with probability
q0 < 1
2 and type B is responsible with a probability 1 q0: Player 1 knows his type, but not
his responsibility for each dispute due to some randomness (usual in medical malpractice
cases, for instance). An expert makes a judgement on player 1's responsibility for each
case with precision q00: It is readily veried that this is isomorphic to the model above with
expert quality q = q0q00 + (1   q0)(1   q00):
5.3 Behavior of the good type
We have focused on equilibria in which the good type accepts a demand if and only if it
does not exceed (1 q)H +c1: This is the maximum expected payment that the good type
can guarantee himself since he always has the option of rejecting an oer. Indeed, using the
same technique in Section 3, we can easily construct other equilibria where the good type's
cuto is D, for any D < (1 q)H+c1: The indierence condition that pins down p is then
p(1   q)H + (1   p)qH   c2 = D; the lower threshold p will be adjusted accordingly.
The two levels of demand made by player 2 in the equilibrium will be qH  c2 and D: The
higher level remains the same, as well as the payo benet of reputation building for very
small priors. Clearly, this modication to the good type's behavior does not add any new
insights.
5.4 Other assumptions and extensions
In our model, the bargaining within each period takes a simple format: the uninformed
player makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer. Such simplicity allows us to focus on the long-lived
player's dynamic incentives, as done also in Schmidt [17], Daughety and Reinganum [6][7]
and others. The one-sided oer by the uninformed player however rules out complex sig-
naling eects. Spier [18] considers settlement bargaining between a single pair of defendant
and plainti under more complex bargaining procotols.
Our analysis considers the case in which the long-lived player takes one of two possible
types. As mentioned earlier, this ts a number of applications, including product liability
25litigations in which a sequence of disputes originate from the same act that a rm has, or is
believed to have, already undertaken. Extending our analysis to the case of multiple types,
nonetheless, oers an interesting direction for future research.
The stake (or the distribution thereof) in each dispute is assumed to be common knowl-
edge. This also seems to be a reasonable description of many applications. For instance,
in securities class actions, the stakes can be traced to the loss in share value. Introducing
private information over the magnitude of the stake, in addition to private information on
responsibility, will signicantly complicate the analysis beyond the scope of the present
paper.
We also assume that the the quality of the third party is constant. We could alterna-
tively think of the model with an expert being drawn from a pool of experts with average
quality q in each period.19
5.5 Further contribution to the legal literature
Alexander [2] studies repeated securities class action lawsuits involving underwriters be-
hind similar claims of fraud in computer-related IPOs. She nds that, beyond very few
exceptions, \the cases settled at an apparent `going rate' of approximately one quarter of
the potential damages... a strong case in this group appears to have been worth no more
than a weak one" (Alexander [2], p.500). Thus, the merit of a case, or \the parties' es-
timates of the strength of the case" (Alexander [2], p500), does not appear to matter for
settlement. Alexander suggests that reputation may play a role here because the securities
class actions often involve long-lived defendants.20 Our results support this observation;
this is exactly what happens in the low reputation region where settlements occur and,
moreover, the amount of settlement is constant over this interval of merits.
We also clarify the puzzle. Although the settlement amount, conditional on agreement,
is independent of merit, settlement is nevertheless meritorious in that the settlement rate
(i.e. the likelihood of settlement) is strictly decreasing in merit over the low reputation
region. This is conrmed by Studdert and Mello [19] who nd that, in medical malpractice
19Another possibility is to simply assume that the expert becomes more precise over time as evidence
and verdicts accrue. But, this will make the problem less tractable.
20For instance, Alexander [2] notices that \two prominent investment banking rms stated in their own
prospectuses that in 1986 they were involved in 60 and 73 lawsuits, respectively, over public oerings they
had underwritten" (Alexander [2], p.558). Also, see Palmrose [16].
26litigations, merits do indeed aect the settlement rate. Furthermore, it is observed that
cases favoring neither party, or \close calls", are more likely to go to court (see Palmrose [16]
and Studdert and Mello [19]). Such cases can be interpreted as corresponding to reputation
levels over, or close to, the intermediate region in our equilibrium, where the bad defendant
rejects plaintis' demands and proceed to trial for sure, or with a very high probability.
Here, the conict between the defendant's long-run interest and the plainti's short-run
interest leads to the low settlement rate. The short-lived plaintis demand a relatively
high compensation based on his estimate of the case's strength. However, the long-lived
defendant is forward looking; the high reputation region is within reach and thus he will
only accept a low demand, an amount less than what the plaintis are willing to oer.
6 Appendix
6.1 Omitted proofs of Section 3
Proof of Proposition 1









p(1   q) + (1   p)q)
:
That is, when the belief is p, if both types of player 1 go to expert and the verdict is not
liable (or liable), then the increased (or decreased) updated belief is equal to 1(p) (or
 1(p)). Notice that  1 (1(p)) = p for any p.
Furthermore, for any positive integer k, dene k(p) recursively such that 2(p) =
1 (1(p)), 3(p) = 1 (2(p)) and, hence, k(p) = 1  
k 1(p)

. In other words, when
the initial belief is p, if both types of player 1 go to expert k consecutive times and the
verdict favors player 1 on each occasion, then the posterior belief updated from p is k(p),
Similarly, we dene  k(p) as the posterior reached from p after k successive non-favorable
expert decisions for player 1. Also, let 0(p)  p.
27Next, let   solve the following:
[1    q][qH +  c1   (1    )c2] = (1    )(qH + c1) +  (1   q)[(1   q)H + c1]: (5)
It is straightforward to observe that such   must belong to (0;1).
Fix any  >  , and consider the prole (rB;rG;d) below, where p;p 2 (0;1) and
player 2's randomization probability at p, x, are to be dened later.
First, player 2's strategy, d, is such that:
 At p = 0, it demands qH + c1 with probability 1;
 At any p 2 (0;p), it demands qH   c2 with probability 1;
 At p = p, it demands (1 q)H +c1 with probability x and qH  c2 with probability
1   x;
 At any p 2 (p;1], it demands (1   q)H + c1 with probability 1.
Second, type G player 1's strategy, rG, is such that, for any p, it accepts a demand s if
and only if s  (1   q)H + c1.
Third, we dene type B player 1's strategy, rB:
 At p = 0, it accepts a demand s if and only if s  qH + c1;
 At any p 2 (0;p],
{ it rejects any s > qH   c2 with probability 1;
{ it accepts any s < qH   c2 with probability 1;













(Notice that r(p) = 1.)
28 At any p 2 (p;p],
{ it rejects any s > maxf(p);(1   q)H + c1g with probability 1;
{ it accepts any s  maxf(p);(1 q)H +c1g with probability 1, where (p) here
is dened later.
 At any p 2 (p;1],
{ it rejects any s > (1   q)H + c1 with probability 1;
{ it accepts any s  (1   q)H + c1 with probability 1.
Finally, the belief is updated by Bayes' rule and the equilibrium strategies whenever
possible. We also assume that the posterior belief assigns probability 1 to type B after an
acceptance of a demand higher than (1   q)H + c1.
We now dene p, p and x. Along the way, the equilibrium payment of type B, V (p),
will also be obtained, as well as (p) for p 2 (p;p].
Dening p At the upper threshold level of belief, p, player 2 must be indierent
between demanding (1   q)H + c1, which is accepted with probability 1, and demanding
qH   c2, which is rejected with probability 1. Thus, it is computed from the equation
(1   q)H + c1 = p





(2q   1)H   c1   c2
(2q   1)H
2 (0;1): (6)
Dening p At p; type B is indierent between accepting and rejecting qH   c2. Let
V0  V (p) and Vn  V (n(p)). Then, since acceptance of the equilibrium demand leads
to revelation, we rst have
V0 = (1   )(qH   c2) + (qH + c1) = qH + c1   (1   )c2: (7)
Rejection, on the other hand, yields the following:
V0 = (1   )(qH + c1) + qV0 + (1   q)V1; (8)
29where the current period expected payment equals qH + c1, the next period continuation
expected payment following a favorable verdict (which takes place with probability 1 q) is
V1 and the corresponding payment following a non-favorable verdict is also V0 (since type
B randomizes at any p < p).
Note here that, since we assume (2q 1)H > c1+c2, V0 > (1 q)H +c1 and that, since
 >  , V1 > (1   q)H + c1 (see (5) above for the denition of  ).
Next, consider the equilibrium payment Vn (at p = n(p)) for any integer n  1. Here,
since the equilibrium demand is rejected for sure, the continuation payment must satisfy
the following recursive structure:
Vn = (1   )(qH + c1) + qVn 1 + (1   q)Vn+1: (9)
Dene N = supfn 2 Z : Vn > (1   q)H + c1g, where Z denotes the set of integers; i.e. N
is the largest integer n such that Vn > (1   q)H + c1.
Then, given Claim 1 below, dene p =  N(p) 2 (0;1). Since V1 > (1 q)H +c1, N
must be positive and, hence, p < p as required by the equilibrium.
Claim 1 (1) Vn is strictly decreasing in n:
(2) N is nte.
Proof. (1) Notice that V0 < qH and V0 is a convex combination of qH + c1 and V1: Then
V1 < V0: Suppose Vn < Vn 1 <  < V0 < qH: From (9), Vn is a convex combination of
qH+c1; Vn 1, and Vn+1; and hence Vn+1 < Vn: The monotonicity of Vn follows by induction.
(2) Suppose to the contrary that N is innite. That is, Vn > (1 q)H+c1 for all n: Then,
since Vn is strictly decreasing, Vn converges to V1 such that (1 q)H +c1  V1 < qH +c1:
But, from (9), it follows that V1 = qH + c1: This is a contradiction.
Dening x At p, player 2 demands (1 q)H +c1 with probability x and qH  c2 with
probability 1   x; both types of player 1 accept the rst demand with probability 1 and
reject the second demand with probability 1. This implies that the equilibrium posterior
at the next period must be such that:
 if (1   q)H + c1 is accepted then the posterior remains at p;
 if a demand is rejected, followed by a favorable verdict to player 1, then the posterior
moves up to 1(p); and
30 if a demand is rejected, followed by a non-favorable verdict to player 1, then the
posterior moves down to  1(p).
Thus, we have
V (p
)  VN = x[(1   )((1   q)H + c1) + VN] + (1   x)X; (10)
where VN is given by the second-order dierence equation (9) with the two initial conditions
V0 and V1 as in (7) and (8) above, and
X  (1   )(qH + c1) + qVN 1 + (1   q)((1   q)H + c1): (11)
Claim 2 There exists a unique x 2 [0;1) that satises (10).
Proof. Simple computation shows that
x =
X   VN
X   (1   )((1   q)H + c1)   VN
:
Note rst that VN  X. This follows from comparing (11) above to the recursive
equation
VN = (1   )(qH + c1) + qVN 1 + (1   q)VN+1;
where, by assumption, VN+1  (1 q)H+c1. Also, we have VN > (1 )((1 q)H+c1)+VN
because, again by assumption, VN > (1   q)H + c1. Thus, x 2 [0;1).
Equilibrium payments At this juncture, we characterize the equilibrium expected pay-
ments of type B. The following is clear:
 For any p  p, V (p) = V0.
 For any p = n(p) with an integer 1  n  N, V (p) = Vn; in particular, V (p) =
VN.
 For any p > p, V (p) = (1   q)H + c1.
We now pin down payments when p 2 (p;p) but p 6= n(p) for any integer 1  n 
N.
31Claim 3 Fix any integer n 2 [1;N] and any p;p0 2 (n 1(p);n(p)). Then, we have
V (p) = V (p
0) < V0:
Proof. Consider the following recursive structure: for any integer k,
Wk = (1   )(qH + c1) + qWk 1 + (1   q)Wk+1
such that W0 = V0 and WN+1 = (1   q)H + c1, where N is dened as above.



















Thus, it is straightforward to see that
Wn = V (p) = V (p
0):
Also, from the same arguments for Claim 1 above, we can show that Wk is strictly
decreasing.
Dening (p) for p 2 (p;p] Recall that, in specifying player 1's equilibrium strategy
earlier, we had deferred the denition of (p) at p 2 (p;p]. Fix any p 2 (p;p], and
dene (p) as satisfying
(1   )(p) + (qH + c1) = V (p);
where V (p) is the equilibrium payment computed above. It is easily seen that (p) <
qH   c2.
It remains to be shown that the prole (rB;rG;d) dened above, together with the
stated beliefs, constitutes a Markov perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
First, given rB and rG, and the denition of p, it is straightforward to establish
optimality of player 2 strategy, d. In particular, note that it is never optimal for player 2
to make a demand s 2 ((1   q)H + c1;qH   c2).
Second, we check optimality of rG, the strategy of type G. This is clear since player
2 never makes a demand less than (1   q)H + c1, which is precisely the amount that this
type expects to pay in total in case the dispute goes to the expert in any period.
Finally, we check optimality of rB.
32 It is straightforward to check optimality of rB at p = 0.
 Fix any p 2 (0;p]. Suppose rst that the demand, s, is less than qH  c2. If type B
accepts this demand, the continuation payment amounts to
(1   )s + (qH + c1) < V0;
while, since rejected demands are not observable, the continuation payment from
rejecting continues to be V0. Thus, accepting any s < qH   c2 for sure is optimal. A
symmetric argument establishes that rejecting any s > qH   c2 for sure is optimal.
The rejection probability r(p), supports the indierence conditions captured by (7)
and (8) above.
 Fix any p 2 (p;p). Here, by Claims 1 and 3 above, we have V (p) < V0, and
accepting the demand qH   c2 yields precisely V0 = (1   )(qH   c2) + (qH + c1)
due to revelation. Thus, rejecting the equilibrium demand, qH   c2, is optimal.
 Consider p = p. If type B accepts the equilibrium demand qH   c2, he reveals his
type and, hence, obtains a continuation payment V0. If he rejects this demand, on
the other hand, he obtains
(1   )(qH + c1) + qVN 1 + (1   q)((1   q)H + c1)  X < V0;
where the last inequality can be obtained from the proof of Claim 3 above. Thus, it
is optimal to reject qH   c2.
Next, consider the demand (1   q)H + c1. Rejection, again, yields a continuation
payment X, while acceptance leads to a payment (1 )((1 q)H +c1)+VN. Since
VN < X and (1   q)H + c1 < X, acceptance is optimal.
 Fix any p 2 (p;1]. Since player 2 plays a pure strategy here, accepting the equilib-
rium demand (1 q)H +c1 cannot reduce the equilibrium posterior. Thus, accepting
yields a continuation payment (1   q)H + c1. On the other hand, rejection yields, at
best, a continuation payment
(1   )(qH + c1) +  ((1   q)H + c1);
implying the optimality of acceptance.
33Proof of Proposition 2
When p1 = 0; it is known that player 1 is the bad type. Therefore, V (0) = qH + c1:
If p1 2 (0;p), player 1 plays mixed strategies and, hence, his payment is obtained from
assuming that he agrees with player 2 on the rst case and reveals his type, i.e. V (p1) =
(1 )(qH c2)+V (0) = qH+c1 (1 )c2: Therefore, the reputation gain is (1 )(c1+c2)
if p1 2 (0;p): The next three properties follow directly from the equilibrium construction.
Proof of Proposition 3
1. We have already established that p is independent of  (see (6) above). By denition,
p is the posterior belief after N consecutive non-favorable expert decisions starting from
p: Therefore, to show p goes to 0 as  goes to 1; it suces to establish that N() goes
to 1 as  goes to 1:
We rst note that that V (pn)   V (p0) ! 0 as  goes to 1 for any xed n: This follows
directly from the dierence equation (4) and its initial conditions. Since V (p0) > (1  
q)H + c1 even when  ! 1; N() goes to 1 by denition.
2. It is immediate from the denition of p that p !
H c1 c2
H as q ! 1. By equation
(2) in the main text, V (p1) !  1 as q ! 1. Therefore, N ! 1 as q ! 1 and, hence,
p becomes the posterior probability obtained after a single non-favorable expert decision
starting from p; that is, p =
p(1 q)
p(1 q)+(1 p)q: Given the limit of p, it follows immediately
that p ! 0 as q ! 1:
6.2 Omitted proofs of Section 4
Proof of Lemma 1
(1) If s is accepted, the continuation (discounted average expected) payment from accepting
s must be at least as good as that from rejecting it.
Since rejected demands are not observable, rejecting any demand results in the same
continuation payment. Also, by (C), accepting any demand strictly above (1   q)H + c1
leads to the same continuation payment at the next period (equal to qH + c1). Then,
accepting any s0 2 ((1 q)H +c1;s) must be strictly better than rejecting it since it yields
a lower immediate payment.
34On the other hand, accepting a demand s0  (1 q)H +c1 needs not lead to revelation
but the continuation payment at the next period must still be bounded above by qH + c1
and, hence, the same arguments imply that such a demand must also be accepted for sure.
(2) If s is rejected, the continuation payment from rejecting s must be at least as good
as that from accepting it. Rejecting s or s0 results in identical expected payments, both in
the current period and each forthcoming period; on the other hand, while accepting s0 and
s yield the same continuation payment as of the next period, accepting s0 > s involves a
strictly higher stage expected payment than accepting s. Thus, any s0 > s must be rejected
for sure.
Proof of Proposition 4
The proof is by contradiction. We consider the following cases.
Case 0. s < (1   q)H + c1 or s > qH + c1.
Any demand s < (1   q)H + c1 is dominated by (1   q)H + c1 since type G accepts
(1 q)H +c1 and player 2's stage payo from type B is qH  c2 > (1 q)H +c1 should he
reject (1 q)H +c1: Therefore, in equilibrium, player 2 will not demand s < (1 q)H +c1:
This contradicts the assumption that s is demanded in equilibrium.
If type B accepts a demand s > qH + c1, by (C), he will reveal his type and the
subsequent payment is qH + c1 each period. If he rejects s; his current period expected
payment is qH +c1 while future expected payments are bounded above by qH +c1. There-
fore, s > qH + c1; if demanded, will be rejected by type B for sure. This contradicts the
assumption that s is accepted.
Case 1. s 2 ((1   q)H + c1;qH   c2).
But then, player 2 can protably deviate by not demanding s and, instead, demanding
any s0 > qH + c1. By (C), type G rejects both s and s0 for sure; from Case 0 above, we
know that type B must also reject s0 for sure. But player 2 expects to earn qH   c2 > s
from type B by seeking an expert and, therefore, would strictly prefer to have s0 rejected
than to have s accepted. This is a contradiction.
Case 2. s 2 (qH   c2;qH + c1] and type B rejects s with probability r 2 (0;1).
But then, consider player 2 deviating by demanding s    > qH   c2 instead of s for
some small  > 0. By Lemma 1, such a demand must be accepted by type B for sure; by
35(C), type G rejects s   . The deviation payo then amounts to
p((1   q)H   c2) + (1   p)(s   );
while the corresponding equilibrium payo is
p((1   q)H   c2) + (1   r)(1   p)s + r(1   p)(qH   c2):
Thus, such a deviation is protable if  < r(s   qH + c2). This is a contradiction.
Case 3. s 2 (qH   c2;qH + c1] and type B accepts s with probability 1.
Let rB be the given equilibrium strategy of type B, and let s > qH   c2 denote
the supremum of demands that it accepts with probability 1 at p; that is, s = supfs :
rB(p;s) = 0g:
Then, by Lemma 1, rB(p;s0) = 0 for any s0 2 (qH   c2;s); and r(p;s00) = 1 for any
s00 2 (s;1). Therefore, player 2's payo is s0 by demanding s0 and qH   c2 < s by
demanding s00: However, both s0 and s00 are dominated by s   s s0
2 which is accepted for
sure, yielding a payo of s   s s0
2 > qH   c2: Therefore, given our arguments against
Cases 0 and 1 above, player 2 will not make a demand other than (1   q)H + c1 or s in
equilibrium.
Suppose now that player 2 demands s with a positive probability. We shall show that
this is impossible.
On the one hand, if player 2's equilibrium strategy demands s with a positive probabil-
ity, type B must accept it with probability 1 by the same argument as in Case 2; otherwise,
player 2 could protably deviate by demanding s    instead of s for some small enough
 > 0.
On the other hand, type B has an incentive to deviate by rejecting s if  >
c1+c2
(2q 1)H+c1+c2:
As we have already established, in equilibrium, the demand can only be either (1 q)H+c1
or s, where the former demand is accepted for sure by both types and the latter is accepted
for sure by type B while rejected for sure by type G. It then follows that the equilibrium
posterior at the next period after observing rejection in the current period must be 1.
Thus, the deviation results in each subsequent player 2 demanding (1   q)H + c1 and,
hence, the continuation payment
(1   )(qH + c1) + ((1   q)H + c1): (12)
36But, in equilibrium, acceptance of s results in revelation (condition (C)) and, hence, the
continuation payment
(1   )s
 + (qH + c1): (13)
Since s > qH c2 and  >
c1+c2
(2q 1)H+c1+c2, (13) exceeds (12) and, therefore, the deviation
is protable. This is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 5
We proceed to prove each claim of Proposition 5 in turn. Fix any  >
c1+c2
(2q 1)H+c1+c2, as
required by Proposition 4, and any Markov perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Also, for ease of
exposition, let V = qH + c1   (1   )c2. We proceed with the following Lemmata.
Lemma 2 For any p 2 (0;1), V (p) 2

(1   q)H + c1;V

.
Proof. First of all, the lower bound is immediate since, with condition (C), any demand
less than (1   q)H + c1 is strictly dominated for player 2 and thus will never occur in
equilibrium.
Next, we establish the upper bound. Let us consider two cases in turn.
First, suppose that every equilibrium demand of player 2 is accepted by type B. Then,
player 2 must play pure strategy (given the assumption that each equilibrium demand is
accepted, player 2 cannot randomize between a low demand and a high demand).
Then, by Proposition 4, the equilibrium demand is either qH   c2 or (1   q)H + c1. If
the demand is (1   q)H + c1; by condition (C), no belief updating occurs and, therefore,
V (p) = (1   q)H + c1 < V : If the demand is qH   c2; type B reveals himself and hence by
the Markov property
V (p) = (1   )(qH   c2) + (qH + c1) = V :
Second, suppose that, at p; some equilibrium demand is rejected with a positive proba-
bility. Let s be the inmum of these demands that are rejected by type B at p: By Lemma
1, all demands below s will be accepted and all demands above s will be rejected by this
type.
Note that type B's equilibrium payment, V (p), is bounded above by rejecting all de-
mands. In particular, given the denition of s, the upper bound equals the continuation
payment from rejecting an equilibrium demand s + ; for some   0.
37But, at the same time, since s +  occurs and is rejected in equilibrium, type H's
equilibrium payment at p is bounded above by the continuation payment from accepting
s + : Therefore, it must be that
V (p)  (1   )(s + ) + (qH + c1);
where qH + c1 is the maximum possible continuation payment.
Now, by the denition of s; we can take  ! 0 and, hence, obtain
V (p)  (1   )s + (qH + c1): (14)
From (14), we are done if s  qH   c2: We simply note that it is impossible that
s > qH   c2: The reasoning is as follows. Suppose not. By the deniton of s; there
exists an equilibrium demand s  s such that s is rejected and player 2 obtains a payo
of qH   c2. But, by the denition of s, any s    > qH   c2 will be accepted by type
B which gives player 2 a payo of s    > qH   c2: Therefore, s cannot be demanded in
equilibrium. This is a contradiction.
Lemma 3 Let p =
(2q 1)H c1 c2
(2q 1)H . For any p 2 (p;1), (1   q)H + c1 is demanded and
accepted for sure.
Proof. By demanding (1   q)H + c1; player 2 obtains a payo of at least
(1   q)H + c1 (15)
since the good type accepts it and he can obtain qH c2 > (1 q)H+c1 if the bad type ever
rejects the demand. Note that all lower demands are strictly dominated by (1   q)H + c1:
By demanding qH   c2; player 2 obtains at most
p((1   q)H   c2) + (1   p)(qH   c2) (16)
since type G will reject it, leading to expected payo of (1   q)H   c2 for player 2, and
qH c2 is player 2's expected payo regardless of type B's response. Note that all demands
in ((1   q)H + c1;qH   c2) are weakly dominated by qH   c2, because type G rejects the
demand and player 2's payo is lower than qH   c2 if type B ever accepts it.
Now, by Lemma 1 and Proposition 4, any demand greater than qH   c2 is rejected by
both types for sure, which gives player 2 a payo of p((1   q)H   c2) + (1   p)(qH   c2):
38Therefore, we only need to compare (15) with (16). Since p > p; the former is larger,
implying that (1   q)H + c1 must be demanded for sure.
Then, since player 2 plays a pure strategy here, and by (C), accepting the equilibrium
demand (1   q)H + c1 cannot reduce the equilibrium posterior. Thus, accepting yields a
continuation payment (1   q)H + c1 to type B. On the other hand, rejection yields, at
best, a continuation payment
(1   )(qH + c1) +  ((1   q)H + c1);
implying that (1   q)H + c1 is accepted for sure.
In order to pin down our nal claim, we rst need the following Lemma.
Lemma 4 Consider the state space P  [0;1] such that P = P1 [P2 [P3: Let V (p) be the
discounted average expected payment at p (with discount factor 0 <  < 1):
At any p 2 P3; with probability 1   q the immediate payment is 0 and the new state
becomes p0 = 1(p); with probability q; the payment is H and the new state becomes p00 =
 1(p); where 1() and  1() are as dened in the proof of Proposition 1 above. If p 2 P1;
V (p) = v1 > 0; If p 2 P2; V (p) = v2 > 0:
We then have the following: If qH  minfv1;v2g, then V (p)  minfv1;v2g for any
p 2 P3:
Proof. Suppose not. Let v3 = infp2P3 V (p): Then, by assumption, v3 < minfv1;v2g: For
any small " > 0; there exists p" 2 P3 such that V (p") < v3 + ": We know that
V (p
") = (1   )qH + ((1   q)V (p
0) + qV (p
00))








")   (1   )qH)
 
 1[v3 + "   (1   )v3 + (1   )v3   (1   )qH]
< v3 + 
 1[" + (1   )(v3   qH)]:
Taking " to 0; we have minfV (p0);V (p00)g < v3+ 1(1 )(v3 qH): However, we know
that, by assumption, v3 < minfv1;v2g  qH: It then follows that minfV (p0);V (p00)g < v3:
This contradicts the denition of v3:
We are now ready to complete the proof of Proposition 5 with the following Lemma.
39Lemma 5 There exists p 2 (0;p) such that, for any p 2 (0;p), V (p) = V .
Proof. We shall follow a series of steps.
Step 1. Fix any p < p, and suppose that player 2 demands (1 q)H+c1 in equilibrium.
Then, type B must reject this demand with a positive probability, and hence the equilibrium
posterior belief after a rejection but before the expert verdict does not exceed p:
Proof of Step 1. Suppose to the contrary that player 1 accepts the demand for sure.
Player 2's payo will be (1 q)H+c1: We shall argue that (1 q)H+c1 is strictly dominated
and cannot be an equilibrium demand.
Consider another demand qH   c2: If player 1 is type G, then he will reject it and
player 2's payo will be (1 q)H  c2; if player 1 is type B, then whether or not he rejects
qH  c2; player 2 will earn qH  c2 in expectation. Therefore, player 2's expected payo is
p(1 q)H +(1 p)qH  c2: Since p < p; this amount is greater than (1 q)H +c1: That
is, qH   c2 dominates (1   q)H + c1:
Since (1 q)H +c1 is rejected with positive probability, all higher demands are rejected
for sure by Lemma 1. It follows that in this case rejection reduces the posterior belief.
Step 2. Fix any p < p. One of the following holds:
(a) V (p) = V ; or
(b) player 1 weakly prefers to reject any equilibrium demand and the equilibrium pos-
terior immediately after the rejection (before the expert verdict) does not exceed p.
Proof of Step 2. There are two cases to consider.
Case 1: (1   q)H + c1 is demanded with a positive probability in equilibrium.
Then, by Step 1, (b) holds.
Case 2: (1   q)H + c1 is demanded with probability 0 in equilibrium.
In this case only qH   c2 can be possibly accepted by Proposition 4.
- If type B's equilibrium strategy prescribes that qH  c2 be rejected for sure, then the
belief will not change after rejection; hence, (b) holds.
- If it prescribes that qH  c2 be accepted with a positive probability, then all demands
greater than (1 q)H +c1 but less than qH  c2 is going to be accepted for sure, and they
are dominated by qH   c2 for player 2 (because only type B accepts these demands).
Now, there are two possibilities here.
First, if qH   c2 is not demanded in equilibrium by player 2, then all equilibrium
demands are rejected and, therefore, belief never changes; hence, (b) holds.
40Second, if qH   c2 is demanded in equilibrium with a positive probability by player 2;
then type B's continuation payment from rejecting any demand is higher than or equal to
that from accepting qH   c2: The latter amounts to
(1   )(qH   c2) + (qH + c1) = V :
But, since V (p)  V by Lemma 2, it must be that V (p) = V ; hence, (a) holds.
At this point, for any positive integer k, let pk =  k(p), as dened in the proof of
Proposition 1 above.
Step 3. Fix any p 2 [pk+1;pk), and suppose that
V  (1   
k)qH + 
k(1   q)H + c1:
Then, we have
V (p)  minf(1   
k+1)qH + 
k+1(1   q)H + c1;V g:
Proof of Step 3. We employ induction. First, consider any p 2 [p1;p): By Step 2, we
have either V (p) = V or an equilibrium demand is rejected and so V (p) is given by the
continuation payment from the rejection.
In the latter case, clearly, V (p)  (1   )(qH + c1) + ((1   q)H + c1). Thus,
V (p)  minf(1   )qH + (1   q)H + c1;V g:
Next, assume that, for any p 2 [pk;pk 1),
V (p)  minf(1   
k)qH + 
k(1   q)H + c1;V g:
We want to show that, for any p 2 [pk+1;pk),
V (p)  minf(1   
k+1)qH + 
k+1(1   q)H + c1;V g:
Again, given Step 2 above, consider the continuation payment when any equilibrium
demand here is rejected such that the posterior immediately after rejection does not go
above p.
Rejection results in the current period expected payment of qH +c1. If the subsequent
expert verdict is favorable, the next period's posterior belongs to [pk;pk 1) and, hence, the
41corresponding continuation payo must be at least minf(1 k)qH +k(1 q)H +c1;V g,
by assumption.
If the expert verdict is not favorable then the next period's posterior must belong to
[pk+2;pk+1). By Lemma 4 (taking P3 = [pk+2;pk+1); P1 = [pk;pk 1); P2 = fp : V (p) =
V gn(P1 [ P3) ), the corresponding continuation payment must also be bounded below by
minf(1   k)qH + k(1   q)H + c1;V g.
Thus, we have




k(1   q)H + c1

;V g
= minf(1   
k+1)qH + 
k+1(1   q)H + c1;V g;
and induction closes the proof of Step 3.
Now, let K be the largest integer such that V  (1 K)qH +K(1 q)H +c1. Then,
Step 3 immediately implies that, for any p 2 [pk+1;pk); k  K, we must have
V (p)  minf(1   
k+1)qH + 
k+1(1   q)H + c1;V g = V :
Since, by Lemma 2 we already know that V (p)  V for any p 2 (0;1), it follows that
V (p) = V for any p < pK:
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